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In a 1992 interview with Business Week, Donna Karan stated "my astrologist sees me
doing something in 1997 that is very, very different from what I'm doing now.  It has nothing to
do with fashion.  I'm dying to know what it is."1  Ignorance is bliss.  In the early months of 1996,
Donna Karan found herself contemplating a major financing decision.  The implications of this
decision could produce the event forecasted by her astrologist.
BACKGROUND
Donna Karan had ties to the fashion industry from her early childhood.  Her father,
Gabby Faske, was a tailor who died when Donna was three years old.  Donna's mother, Helen,
was a showroom model in Manhattan.  After high school, Donna attended Parson's School of
Design to further her interest in fashion.  She left Parson’s before graduating to join Anne Klein
& Company.  After only a few months on the job, she was fired because of her relationship with
a boutique owner, Mark Karan.  After marrying Mr. Karan, she was hired once again by Anne
Klein.
Donna quickly became an asset to the Anne Klein organization.  Over the next 15 years,
she became a top designer, launching Anne Klein II (a slightly less expensive clothing line) in
1983.  She divorced her husband and married Stephan Weiss, a sculptor, in 1983.  Takihyo Inc.,
major partners and financial managers of Anne Klein, disagreed with Donna's plans for the
company, so they fired her.  However, they urged Donna to open her own company, which she
did in 1985 with $3 million of funding from Takihyo (owned by Messrs. Taki and Mori).  From
this humble beginning, Donna Karan built her design company into a major player on Seventh
Avenue.
In 1993, Donna Karan made plans for an initial public offering (IPO) that did not
materialize.  Primary motivators for this deal included her desire to diversify into men's and
children's wear, as well as cosmetics.  Sources close to the company reported that internal
friction between Takihyo (Messrs. Taki and Mori) and Donna and her husband led to the
disintegration of the IPO.  Donna Karan and her Japanese partners could not agree on the amount
of restricted stock Donna would receive from the IPO.  In addition, Takihyo wanted Donna
Karan to follow industry norms and license the beauty supply and fragrance division.  Donna
Karan and her husband preferred to maintain creative control over the division and therefore kept
it in-house.  The company denied these claims and cited that a weakening apparel market and
slower-than-expected sales forced the cancellation of the stock offering.  "We don't believe that
our offering would receive a valuation that truly reflects the company's long-term potential for
growth and profitability.”2
Industry analysts cited fundamental issues with the IPO structure itself.  For example,
principals in the company would get royalties from the revenue stream.  In addition, only 14
percent of the money raised in the IPO would go to fuel the company's future growth; the
remaining 86 percent was to be used to pay off partners and reduce debt.  There was also
industry concern over the management team — because Messrs. Mori and Taki would have
smaller roles (they had the expertise of building apparel companies), and Donna Karan and her
husband had limited financial management experience.  Mr. Charles Ronson, publisher of the
Donna Karan International 1996
2
IPO Value Monitor, said "Once this turmoil ends, they will presumably be able to present a
unified face to the public and seek to go public again."3
To attain that goal, Donna Kar n hired a CFO, David Golden, in mid-March 1994.  He
was charged with implementing cost containment policies and ensuring that the bottom line of
the company was such that it could move forward to increase its credit lines and/or succeed in its
private debt placement.  Mr. Golden was fired six weeks into his employment, on April 29, 1994.
 He charged "...that the financial health of Donna Karan International was significantly worse
than what was perceived by the financial markets."  Donna Karan fired back, stating that "Mr.
Golden was negligent in preparing contingency plans needed by Citibank when renewing credit
lines.  He put the company in technical default.”4 This all came at a time when DKI was trying to
sell a private placement of debt to decrease its reliance on its expiring short-term line of credit.
THE BUSINESS OF DONNA KARAN INTERNATIONAL
By 1995, Donna Karan International, lnc. was one of the world's leading international
fashion design houses.  That same year, the Oprah Winfrey show featured an hour-long program
with Donna Karan and a live fashion show.  The program was topped off by a conversation
between Karan and Barbra Streisand who phoned in from an exotic movie location.  “Hey,
honey!”  Oprah then asked, "OK, Barbara, what's your favorite Donna outfit?”  Barbara's
response "Ooh, it’s the dresses she does that hide my fanny!"5 Karan's designs focused on
comfortable, practical yet sensual, hip-s imming clothes that accentuate the positive and
eliminate the negative.
Product Lines
The company designed, contracted for the manufacture of, marketed, and distributed
"designer" and "bridge" collections of men's and women’s clothing, sportswear, accessories and
shoes.  Women's apparel was the primary focus of the company.  Labels included Donna Karan
New Yorkâ (the higher-end signature collection) and DKNYâ (the casual, more moderately
priced collection).
The original Donna Karan New Yorkâ Collection was based on the concept of seven
easy pieces: bodysuit and tights, dresses, skirts, blouses, jackets, pants, and accessories.  When
layered in combinations, these items achieved a varied but consistent high-fashion look.  The
Donna Karan New Yorkâ Collection represented high-fashion apparel, made primarily with
exclusively developed luxury fabrics and designed with an emphasis on comfort and fit.
DKNYâ was launched in 1989 as a "bridge" collection that consisted of women's apparel
and accessories.  It was established as a separate brand name to attract a broader customer base
and to create a distinct and more casual fashion identity at lower prices, while retaining an
association with the Donna Karan New Yorkâ designer image.  This line included jeans,
activewear and classic designs and was based on the seven easy piece concept that complimented
all aspects of a women's lifestyle, including "desk-to-dinner" wear.
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Men's apparel lines, first introduced in 1991, followed the Donna Karan New Yorkâ and
DKNYâ genre.  Accessories and shoes were sold within the two distinct collections.  Children's
wear was launched in late 1995, offered under the DKNYâ label as DKNY Kidsâ.
DKI's beauty division was established in 1992 to further leverage the strong brand name
and image that the company had developed.  The strategy was to provide the consumer with
beauty products consistent with the Donna Karan New Yorkâ "head to toe" philosophy.  This
product line began with fragrances and expanded into bath and body treatments (cleansing
lotions and body creams) for both men and women.  However, the beauty division had not
provided a positive contribution to DKI's overall operating profits since its inception.  From 1992
through 1995, it incurred cumulative losses of $20.4 million.  Ms. Karan believed that to insure
her beauty products were of highest quality and to best manage the brand, the company had to
control all aspects of its beauty division, including product development, package design,
production, and marketing.  In contrast, Messrs. Taki and Mori believed that Donna Karan's
foray into beauty supplies should follow the pattern of the industry: licensing the rights out to a
company with marketing and production expertise.6  In addition, a November 29, 1993 Business
Week article cited quality problems and production glitches in the perfume division.
Licensing Agreements/Trademarks
While employed by Anne Klein, Donna Karan saw the negative effect of licensing.  "I
came out of Anne Klein, and have seen how a business gets diffused through licensing...I saw
how difficult it was to maintain continuity and quality and consistency and how the message can
get mixed."7  When DKI utilized licensing, licensees met the company's design and quality
standards, while management took an active role in the design, quality control, advertising,
marketing, and distribution of each licensed product.  In most cases DKI obtained minimum
sales level and advertising agreements with each licensee.  In 1996 Donna Karan had licenses for
hosiery, intimate apparel, eyewear, children's apparel, handkerchiefs and face towels, and design
patterns.
The Donna Karan New Yorkâ and DKNYâ trademarks were licensed to DKI through
Gabrielle Studios, a personally owned company of Ms. Karan and her husband, Mr. Weiss.
Terms and conditions stated that each license could be terminated by Gabrielle Studios upon the
occurrence of a change of control of DKI at the senior management level (involuntary).  Another
condition of the license was that if Donna Karan was not CEO and chief designer, or chairman of
the board and chief designer (voluntary) then DKI retained the right to use the Donna Karan
New Yorkâ and DKNYâ trademarks only in industry segments in which the trademarks were
previously used.
Employees/Board of Directors
In 1996 the company had 1,580 employees (1,410 in the U.S.).  Its Board was comprised
primarily of internal DKI employees and equity partners: Donna Karan (ch irman, CEO and
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chief designer), Stephan Weiss (vice-chairman and director), Stephen Ruzow ( resident, COO,
and director), Tomio Taki (director), and Frank Mori (director).
Distribution Channels
Donna Karan International sold its products through a limited number of better
department stores and specialty stores including Bloomingdale's, Macy's, Sak's Fifth Avenue,
Neiman Marcus, Bergdorf Goodman, and Nordstrom.  Internationally, the company had free-
standing stores and boutiques.  In the United States, the only freestanding stores the company
operated were its 37 outlet stores, located in 22 states.
Advertising/Marketing
All worldwide advertising, public relations programs, and marketing programs were
managed on a centralized basis through the company's creative services and public relations
departments located in New York.  This ensured a consistent global image for DKI and its
products.  DKI advertised principally in print and outdoor media but also used video for point of
purchase displays, as well as mailers, newsletters, and catalogs.  In addition, Ms. Karan used
celebrities in her ads.  This was possible because of her own celebrity status, but cost the
company millions of dollars.
The company marketed its Donna Karan New Yorkâ  brand name and image through its
“Woman to Woman" newsletter.  This newsletter was a dialogue between the company, the
designer, and the consumer.  DKI used feedback from the newsletter to improve and focus the
company's marketing program.
Operating Strategies
In order to achieve its current status as one of the world’s leading international fashion
design houses, DKI had implemented a number of operating strategies.  The firm built the global
name recognition and distinctive brand image of Donna Karan New Yorkâ in the exclusive
designer market.  For the larger bridge market, they established the DKNYâ brand.
DKI had established successful designer collections and then leveraged the success of
these collections and the depth of its design talent into the larger bridge market.  This approach
was first utilized with the DKNYâ women’s apparel division.  Subsequently, the firm
successfully implemented this approach to the men’s apparel division and the shoe division.  The
beauty division was expected to be next in this process of brand leveraging.
Worldwide expansion had been an integral component of the firm’s strategies since its
inception.  International sales had been expanding rapidly and the firm was comm ted to
developing the necessary infrastructure to support these sales.  In addition, licensing of free-
standing retail stores in international markets should enhance the company’s competitive
position in its industry.
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In order to maintain brand exclusivity, DKI employed coordinated global advertising and
marketing, selective licensing arrangements, and controlled retail distribution.  These activities
were managed on a centralized basis through the company’s Creative Services and Public
Relations Departments.  To reinforce its exclusive image and appeal, the company sold through a
limited number of stores: better department and large specialty stores such as Bloomingdale’s,
Macy’s, Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, and Nordstrom; and better boutiques catering to
fashion-conscious customers.  Consistent with its operating philosophy, DKI had been and would
continue to be selective in pursuing licensing opportunities.  The firm had also maintained strict
control over design, quality, advertising, marketing, and distribution in all of ts product
licensing arrangements.
Finally, the company offered a “head-to-toe” assortment of complementary luxury
product categories designed to satisfy the lifestyle needs of its customers.  Over the last five
years, DKI had expanded its product offerings in the following business segments:
                        Line Market Segment
Donna Karan New Yorkâ Essentials       Women
DKNYâ Essentials       Women
Donna Karan New Yorkâ  Signature       Men
DKNYâ Jeans and Petite       Women
Donna Karan New Yorkâ  Beauty Products       Women
DK Menâ Beauty Products       Men
DKNYâ Shoes       Women
DKNYâ Shoes       Men
Each of these strategic initiatives expanded and extended the firm’s product lines, as well as
contributing to strengthening of the brand in consumer markets.
Growth Strategies
The company’s goals have been and continue to be the leveraging of its strong brand
name and image in the consumer marketplace.  It has expanded its product offerings and
increased its presence in domestic and international markets.
In order to support these goals, DKI has identified a number of strategies.  One of these
initiatives is to selectively increase the “number of doors” through which its more recently
introduced products will be sold, both domestically and internationally.  More specifically, the
firm planned to approximately double the 1995 sales level of its DKNYâ men’s wear business in
1996.
In international markets, DKI planned to open 10 fre -standing retail stores in 1996.  In
addition, the firm was considering the opening of full-price, ree-standing retail stores by or in
arrangements with third parties in select locations in the United States.
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Product segmentation and expansion were expected to provide greater “head-to-toe”
assortments to better satisfy the lifestyle needs of existing customers, as well as to appeal to new
customers.  Over the next two years, the following areas had been identified for expansion:
  Line Market Segment
Donna Karan New Yorkâ Fragrance Line Women
Donna Karan New Yorkâ Casual Sportswear Men
DKNYâ Activewear Women
Donna Karan New Yorkâ - expand the Essentials Women
    collection under a new Signature label
The company had plans to target broader market segments at lower price points than its
apparel products.  This would include marketing additional luxury products in categories such as
beauty and accessories.
Since DKI brands had successfully been established worldwide, the firm planned to
expand its licensing efforts through the selective granting of new product licenses.  Some areas
targeted for this initiative included jeanswear and related apparel, swimwear, DKNYâ
underwear, watches, and home furnishings.
Characteristics of Publicly-Owned Competitors
The fashion industry has always been and is expected to continue to be extremely
competitive.  DKI competed with numerous designers and manufacturers of apparel and
accessory products, both domestic and foreign.  Although no one firm enjoyed a significant
percentage of total industry sales, some were significantly larger and had substantially greater
resources than DKI.  In addition, with appropriate financial support, talented designers could
evolve into competitors within several years of establishing a new label.
Three publicly held firms have been identified as having similar size and competitive
position to DKI: Liz Claiborne, Inc.; Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation; and Jones Apparel Group,
Inc.  Their business characteristics are described below.
Product Lines
Liz Claiborne had three major product areas.  The first, LIZ CLAIBORNE, included
professional career wear with desk to dinner versatility, and the accessories group, which
featured handbags and jewelry.  Also encompassed in this segment was the LIZ NIGHT label,
which featured special occasion dresses.  The second category was the menswe r division, which
offered men's business and casual wear, sportswear, and furnishings under the CLAIBORNE
brand name.  Lastly, the cosmetics division offered fragrance and bath and body care products
under the LIZ CLAIBORNE and  CLAIBORNE FOR MEN trademarks.
Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation consisted of four integrated operations: Wholesale, Home
Collection, Direct Retail, and Licensing Alliances.  The Wholesale Division was broken up into
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two categories: Polo Ralph Lauren Menswear and Polo Ralph Lauren Womenswear.  The
Womenswear segment included, but was not limited to, Ralph Lauren Collection® and
Collection Classics® and RALPH/Ralph Lauren®.  The former expressed the Company's up-to-
the-moment fashion vision for women and also played an important strategic role by reinforcing
the Polo Ralph Lauren image of style and high fashion.  The latter consisted of classic and
fashion items ranging from career wear to casual weekend apparel.  This label was younger in
attitude and lower in price.  The Menswear Division included Polo by Ralph Lauren®, Polo
Sport®, Ralph Lauren/Purple Label Coll ction®, and Polo Golf® brands.  Polo Ralph Lauren,
which introduced The Home Collection in 1983, was one of the first major apparel designers to
extend its designer principles and brands to a complete line of home furnishings.
Jones Apparel Group participated in four principal segments of the women's apparel
market: career sportswear, casual sportswear, suits, and dresses.  The company's success was
enhanced by its ability to maintain a designer image through marketing its name brands in the
women's “better” market.  Its labels included Jones New York®, Evan Picone®, Picone
Evening®, Saville®, and Lauren Ralph Lauren®, which it licensed from the Polo Ralph Lauren
Corporation.  The company offered consumers an extensive range of better sportswear geared
primarily for the career woman's working needs.  A line of evening dresses under the Picone
Evening® label was launched in 1996.
Licensing Agreements/Trademarks
Each of these three companies used licensing agreements extensively, principally in their
non-core businesses.  For example, Liz Claiborne had six licensing agreements for its eyewear
collection, home furnishing products, men's tailored clothing, and women's watches.  Polo Ralph
Lauren's strategy was to seek out the premier producer in the field it was licensing.  Some of the
product lines it licensed included children's apparel, Home Collection, and fragrance and skin
care products.  Jones Apparel Group utilized licensing agreements more extensively than the
other firms in this peer group.  Over 35 licensing agreements existed for the Jones New York
brand and 14 agreements were used for the Evan Picone l bel.  These agreements covered men's
clothing, women's intimate apparel, footwear, and accessories.
Board of Directors
In all three cases, the companies in this peer group had boards with a large percentage of
outside directors.  These board members had extensive industry experience and made their
knowledge available to their firm’s management teams.
Distribution Channels
Liz Claiborne, Inc. had retail stores and outlets both in the U.S. and abroad (83 outlets in
1996).  The Company's wholesale activities were through department stores and specialty and
chain stores.  In early 1996, Liz Claiborne introduced Liz Edge and Liz View, in-store
maintenance programs designed to enhance the way the company's products appeared on the
selling floor.
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Polo Ralph Lauren used the "shop within a shop" boutique distribution method in better
department stores.  In addition, the company had 67 outlet stores and 28 Polo stores.  These
distribution channels were located in the U.S. and overseas.
Jones Apparel Group distributed its products through approximately 1,550 customers,
including department stores, specialty retailer accounts, and direct mail catalog companies
throughout the U.S. and Canada.  The company had 196 factory outlets and four full-price stores.
Jones' outlets sold company merchandise, as well as products from its licensees.  Jones Apparel
Group used in-house sales specialists to enhance its retail sales in a manner similar to Liz
Claiborne, Inc.
Advertising/Marketing
The fashion industry utilized primarily print ads developed through in-house advertising
and public relations departments for the marketing of its wares.  The practice of in-house
development of advertising campaigns ensured consistency across product lines.
INDUSTRY TRENDS
The Fashion Industry
The fashion industry has always been an extremely competitive segment of the much
broader apparel industry.  It has its own unique characteristics that determine the ways in which
participating firms compete.  Generally, the most important factors that lead to success in the
marketplace for both companies and their head designers are fashion, image, quality, and service
Price does not seem to be a major component of the business strategy of successful firms in this
industry.
It has been said that fashion is about seduction, even though this sounds a bit crass.
Dressing to be sexually seductive is quite obvious, but that is not the main theme for either firms
or designers.  Rather, the point being made is that fashion exists to seduce customers into buying
the product.
In contrast, clothing is another matter.  Children need clothing as they grow up, and men
and women need clothing for work, leisure, and play time.  Fashion is more like the icing on the
cake, the non-essentials that designers seek to make “essential” for those who can and will make
these purchases.  These are the garments that are coveted by the consumer, primarily because
they seem irresistible.  This is what the designer of fashion must accomplish, in contrast to a
manufacturer of clothing.
The artist creates paintings or sculptures to satisfy an inner drive.   Fashion do s not
inhabit such an exalted level.  The glamour and hype of the industry are focused on a more
practical goal, not only to design, but also to market and sell its creations.  When designers forget
these aspects of their profession and simply churn out “the basics,” or make the opposite mistake
of getting caught up and swept away in some farfetched, unrealistic dream, their customers will
not always follow with their interest and their purchases.  The successful designer is one who
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balances the elements of design with creative marketing.  They will be the ones who generate
value for their companies and themselves over time.  Merging function with fashion is a formula
for success.
The fashion industry talks about spirational apparel — a wardrobe that embodies a way
of life that a customer craves for and “must have.”  Most of the major designers follow this
mantra.
The Apparel Industry
Shifts in demographics and changes in consumer buying habits over the last decade
created challenges of a creative and financial nature for the fashion industry.  As the baby boom
generation approached their half century mark, they are mobilizing their financial resources for
college tuitions and their own retirement years.  Expensive suits and evening wear have felt this
change in buying patterns.  In addition, more women in the work force means fewer shopping
trips.  Less time to shop results in more targeted trips — shopping “smarter” rather than a
leisurely stroll down the aisles to “see what’s there” — less impulse buying.
Between 1989 and 1995 personal consumer expenditures in the United States increased
by 37 percent.  In contrast, the apparel industry experienced a more subdued record. Men’s
apparel sales grew by only 16 percent in this same period, while women’s apparel sales actually
declined by 13 percent, from $84 billion to $73 billion.
In a 1994 survey by Glamour Magazine, 34 percent of its readers had increased their
shopping at off-price stores.  Consumers have also been spending less on apparel and clothing as
a percent of their incomes.  In 1960 this ratio was 8.1 percent and by 1980 it was down to 6.1
percent.  In the 1990s the ratio continued to decline, reaching 5.3 percent in 1993.  Contributing
factors were consumers “waiting for price reductions on sale items,” as well as the “relaxed
look” that does not need to be replaced every season.9
The “dressing down” phenomenon has also taken hold in the workplace.  Close to 90
percent of American workers dress down at least some of the time.  And, in a study supported by
Levi Straus & Company, 7 percent of workers were allowed to “dress casually” every day, in
1992.  By 1995, the figure was up to 33 percent and they projected a 75 percent rate in the year
2000.
It seems quite clear that value is replacing fashion as the prime concern of price-
conscious consumers.  And, the number of price-conscious consumers continues to increase.
Unless some reason for change occurs in the near future, it seems likely that these patterns of
consumption will continue to influence the direction of the apparel industry.
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF DONNA KARAN INTERNATIONAL
The revenues of DKI had grown at a compound average annual rate of 35 percent from
1989 through 1995.  While this rate was significantly higher than the overall fashion and apparel
industry, the firm’s sales were growing even faster outside the U.S.  In 1995 net revenues in
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Japan, Europe, and the Middle East and other parts of Asia represented 14.1 percent, 12.4
percent and 5.1 percent, respectively, of net revenues (excluding net revenues generated from
outlet stores and licensing).  International sales increased from 14.4 percent of net revenues in
1991 to 33.9 percent of net revenues in 1995.  Management believed that this trend would
continue over the next few years and, therefore, was continuing to build the infrastructure to
support worldwide demand for the Donna Karan brand.
The company engaged both domestic and foreign contractors for the production of its
products.  In fiscal 1995, approximately 47 percent of direct purchases of raw materials, labor,
and finished goods for its apparel, accessories, shoes, and beauty products were produced in
Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and other Asian countries.  In contrast, 28 percent were
produced in the United States and 23 percent in Europe.
Although revenues grew rapidly in the 1990s, a turning point for profits was reached in
1993, when the company's expenses ballooned at an even more rapid rate and profits gradually
shrunk.  In 1994 inventories were bloated and orders had slipped.  Advertising and other media
expenses more than doubled from 1993 to 1994.  In 1993 alone, the menswear and cosmetics
divisions lost $20 million.  All of these factors put increased pressure on profits.
In 1996 the idea of an IPO for Donna Karan was resurrected.  The company was having
difficulty sustaining its growth with internal financing and/or costly short-term debt. Stephen
Ruzow, president, said "the company will try to keep its sales increase to 10 percent so it will not
exceed its ability to finance its growth."10 The company did not adhere to his plan, as net revenue
growth was 21 percent from 1994 to 1995.  In 1994, all attempts at a private long-term debt
placement failed, but the company had successfully negotiated a $125,000,000 credit line with
Citibank through 1998, although this cost DKI $1.6 million in up-front fees.  Interest was
payable at the bank’s prime rate (currently 8.25%) or, at the option of the company, a fixed
margin (ranging from .5% to .75%) over LIBOR.
Industry analysts speculated on three major forces that led to Donna Karan attempting
another IPO in 1996:
(1) A cash infusion was needed to reduce the high debt levels;
(2) Due to differences in management style and vision for the company, Takihyo w ted
to sever its relationship with DKI.  This was a very expensive decision for Donna Karan:
she would lose not only Takihyo’s initial financial investment but would have to repay
the profits they reinvested into the company over the last 10 years.  She would also lose
their business expertise; and
(3) Donna and her husband wanted to withdraw their earnings retained by the company
over the past 10 years.  The financial markets looked upon the Donna Karan IPO ot as a
means of achieving financing for the growth of the company, but as a way for the
partners to cash out of the business. Stephen Weiss, Donna Karan’s husband, said "Look,
if someone comes along with $1 billion to buy this business, I’m out of here."11
Financial History of Donna K ran International
11
The Financial Environment in 1996
In contrast to the economy of 1993, conditions in early 1996 contributed to much more
optimism concerning the potential success of a Donna K ran IPO.  Donna Karan competed
primarily in the luxury retail business segment of the apparel marketplace.  These activities were
intrinsically tied to the overall health of the economy.  The United States economy had been
growing strongly for almost five years, since the end of the last recession in March of 1991.
In consultation with their lead underwriters, Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., and Bear
Stearns & Co., Inc., management concluded that the time was right to pursue an initial public
offering.  This was a time of strong demand on the part of investors for “retail stars.”  There
seemed to be an everlasting faith in the selling power of luxury goods.  Data below show the
success of recently sold IPO’s of companies in the “luxury retail” market.  Since Donna Karan’s
operations were in this category, investor demand was expected to pave the way for a successful
offering.
Stock Market Performance of Luxury Market IPO’s
        Name     IPO Date Offering Price
Stock Price
June 20, 1996
Percentage
     Gain     
    Gucci       Oct. 1995            $22         $66.62     +202.8
    Estee Lauder       Nov. 1995            $26         $39.88     +  53.4
    Revlon       Feb. 1996            $24         $28.88     +  20.3
    Saks       May 1996            $25         $32.12     +  28.5
In the underwriting business, public perceptions as well as company fundamentals may
cause stock prices to soar or plunge.  The current market environment for IPO’s had been quite
strong.  Almost 600 firms went public in 1995, approaching the record levels of 1984 and 1987
(Exhibit 14).  Early in 1996 public estimates showed a record $15 billion worth of IPO’s ere
scheduled for the second quarter of that year.
Investors were especially interested in firms with strong “brand names” that were
recognizable worldwide, which would contribute to the success of an IPO in the after-market.  In
“brand-conscious” times these names have power and an element of mystique that contribute to
stock market performance.
Another positive aspect of the DKI offering was the potential of spreading the Donna
Karan name to a wider variety of product categories in coming years.  On a preliminary basis,
the underwriters estimated a selling price range for DKI shares of $20-$23.
The Offering
On June 27, 1996, Donna Karan planned to offer 10,750,000 shares of common stock to
the public at $24 each and have those shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange.  The
proposed disposition of the proceeds was detailed in a New York Times article dated June 29,
1996:
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Number of shares offered     10,750,000
Issue price $                24
Total gross proceeds $258,000,000 100.0%
Less underwriting fees $  15,480,000     6.0%
Net proceeds realized by DKI $242,520,000   94.0%
Disposition of Proceeds
Donna Karan/Stephan Weiss $  58,000,000  22.5%
Takihyo Partners $  58,000,000  22.5%
Gabrielle Studios* $    5,000,000    2.0%
Debt paydown $  80,000,000  31.0%
President bonus $    5,000,000    2.0%
General corporate purposes $  36,520,000  14.0%
* Gabrielle Studios was a company Ms. Karan owns personally which licensed the Donna
   Karan name to Donna Karan International (DKI).
Donna Karan International's success hinged on implementation of its operating and
growth strategies.  The operating strategies centered arou d the importance of the Donna Kara
brand.  They included building a global name and image, brand leveraging, worldwide growth,
maintaining brand exclusivity, and "head to toe" dressing.  The growth strategies of the company
were to increase the number of sale locations (including free-standing retail stores), to continue
product segmentation and expansion, to broaden the customer base, and to expand licensing
efforts.  In order to implement these strategies, DKI needed funds to finance its growth.  In the
past, the company had relied on cash flow from operations, bank lines of credit, and term loans
for its capital requirements.  Private debt placement options had been exhausted.  Because of the
previously stated growth and operational strategies, the company required a capital infusion to
achieve its goals.  Current operations could not support the growth anticipated by the firm.
MANAGEMENT'S CHALLENGE
Donna Karan and her management team faced a major decision point in the life of the
firm.  Was this the right time for an IPO?  They had tried two years ago and were not successful.
From a business perspective, funds are needed more than ever to carry out the firm’s plans.
The underwriters had discussed the structure of the IPO with DKI management.
Repayment of debt was approximately 33 percent, at the high end of the range of many recent
IPO’s.  Fees in the 6 percent range were in line with IPO transactions.  However, the more than
50 percent of net proceeds being distributed to owners had raised a number of questions with
potential investors.  Under these varied market conditions and potential shareholder concerns,
what is likely to be the acceptance of this IPO initially as well as over time?  The day before the
offering was scheduled, the underwriters decided to raise their price range to $23-$25 per share.
This action implied high potential demand for the shares, at least in the short run.  However,
longer-term considerations, and the nature of both business and financial markets, also had to be
incorporated into the final decision.
Endnotes
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EXHIBITS
Exhibit 1
Donna Karan International Inc.
Income Statement and Debt Levels
(in thousands)
Income Statement
  December 28
     1991
           January 2
           1993
         January 2
        1994
        January 1
       1995
December 31
   1995
Net Revenues $   196,570 $  259,947 $  364,705 $ 420,164 $   510,126
Cost of Sales      132,074    167,638     234,230     271,172      330,689
Gross Profit $     64,496 $   92,309 $  130,475 $  148,992 $    179,437
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses $     54,544 $   63,933 $  102,748 $  119,995 $    136,906
Operating Income $       9,952 $   28,376 $    27,727 $    28,997 $      42,531
Other Income (expense)
    Equity and Earnings of Affiliate
    Interest Expense
    Interest Income
    Other Expense
    Gain on Sale of Interests in Affiliates**
                     -
   (82)
                     -
                     -
              -  
                        -
(892)
                        - 
                        -
           -  
                      -
(4,063)
                     -
(2,980)
           -  
                     -
      (8,862)
                     -
      (2,651)
            -  
         2,519
        (7,650)
                    -
                    -
        18,673
Income Before Income Tax $       9,870 $  27,484 $   20,684 $    17,484 $      56,073
Provision for Income Tax          2,187      3,522       1,312        1,139          2,398
Net Income $       7,683 $  23,962 $   19,372 $    16,345 $      53,675
*   Other Expense represents costs associated with proposed IPO (1993) and proposed debt offering (1994).
** Gain on sale of affiliate:
In March 1995 Donna Karan International sold 70% of its interest in Donna Karan Japan to a nonaffiliated party.
Source:  Donna K ran International Inc. Annual Reports, various years.
.
Exhibit 2
Donna Karan International Inc.
Balance Sheet
(in thousands)
             1994       1995  
ASSETS
Current Assets
Cash $    3,728 $   12,153
Accounts Receivable, net of allowances
   of $22,507 @ 12/95 and $15,013 @12/94     49,879      62,231
Inventories     63,606      85,655
Prepaid Expenses and Other Current Assets       8,241        9,946
   Total Current Assets $125,454 $ 169,985
Property and Equipment, at Cost-Net     24,467 $   22,505
Deposits and Other Non-current Assets       7,083      11,485
   Total Assets $157,004    203,975
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
AND PARTNERS’ CAPITAL
Current Liabilities
Short-term Borrowing Under Revolving
  Credit Facility $   11,214 $            -
Accounts Payable     29,153      53,825
Accrued Expenses and Other Current Liabilities     17,374      15,766
Current Portion of Long-term Debt     15,424        7,759
   Total Current Liabilities     73,165      77,350
Long-term Debt     36,002      45,779
  Total Liabilities $109,167  $123,129
Stockholders’ Equity and Partners’ Capital
Common Stock                     1,146        1,146
Retained Earnings and Partners’ Capital     46,886      79,748
Cumulative Translation Adjustment                      (195)          (48)
   Total Stockholders’ Equity and Partners’ Capital           $      47,837   $ 80,846
   Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity and Partners’ Capital          $    157,004   $203,975
Source:  Donna K ran International Inc. Annual Reports, various years.
Exhibit 3
Donna Karan International
Financial Results of the Company, In fiscal years
Source:  Donna Karan International Prospectus, June 27, 1996 and The New York Times, June 20, 1994, page D3.
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Exhibit 4
Donna Karan International
Net Revenue of Company Activities
(in millions)
Business Activity 1995 1994 1993
Donna Karan New YorkR collections for women    
(apparel, accessory, shoe collections) $77 $79 $75
DKNYR collections for women (apparel, accessory, 
shoe collections) 271 232 193
Donna Karan New YorkR collections for men 
(apparel, accessory, shoe collections)  40  28  18
DKNYR collections for men (apparel, accessory, shoe
collections)  37  18  22
Beauty Products  30  17  8
Outlet Stores and Licensing  55  46  49
     TOTALS 510 420 365
Source:  Donna Karan International Prospectus, June 27, 1996, page 35.
Exhibit 5
Liz Claiborne, Inc.
Income Statement
(in thousands)
(for the years ended)
December 31, 1995 December 31, 1994
Net Revenues $ 2,081,630 $2,162,901
Cost of Sales 1,290,929  1,407,694
   Gross Profit $    790,701 $  755,207
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses 600,471 604,421
Restructuring Charge              -      30,000
   Operating Income 190,230 $  120,786
Other Income (expense)
   Investment and Other Income, net   12,884    10,663
   Income Before Income Tax $    203,114 $  131,449
Provision for Income Tax 76,200    48,600
   Net Income $    126,914 $    82,849
Exhibit 6
Liz Claiborne, Inc.
Balance Sheet
 (in thousands)
ASSETS December 31, 1995
Current Assets
Cash $    54,722
Marketable Securities 383,128
Accounts Receivable, net of allowances 126,053
Inventories 393,363
Deferred Income Tax 30,235
Other Current Assets       77,710
Total Current Assets $1,065,211
Property and Equipment, at cost-net 239,467
Other Noncurrent Assets      2 4,565
Total Assets $1,329,243
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
Current Liabilities
Accounts Payable $   138,000
Accrued Expenses and Other Current Liabilities 155,449
Income Tax Payable  12,648
Total Current Liabilities $   306,897
Long-term Debt 1,115
Deferred Income Tax 7,722
Commitment and Contingency 25,283
Total Liabilities $   341,017
Stockholders’ Equity
Common Stock $    88,219
Paid-in-Capital in excess of Par 35,075
Retained Earnings 1,255,325
Cumulative Translation Adjustment (1,256)
Common Stock in Treasury at cost (389,137)
Total Stockholders’ Equity $   988,226
Total Liabilities and Stockholders’ Equity $1,329,243
Exhibit 7
Polo Ralph Lauren Corporation
Income Statement
(in thousands)
(for the years ended)
March 30, 1996 April 1, 1995
Net Revenues $1,019,873 $   846,635
Cost of Sales 583,546 474,999
   Gross Profit $  436,327 $   371,636
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses 309,207 261,506
   Operating Income $  127,120 $  110,130
Other Income (Expense)
   Interest Expense
   Equity in Net Loss of Affiliate
(16,287)
(1,101)
(16,450)
    (262)
   Income Before Income Tax $  109,732 $   93,418
Provision for Income tax    10,925     13,244
   Net Income $   98,807 $  80,174
Exhibit 8
Polo Ralph Lauren
Balance Sheet
(in thousands)
ASSETS       March 30,1996
Current Assets
Cash & Cash Equivalents $    13,568
Accounts Receivable Net of Allowance 144,999
Inventories 269,113
Prepaid Expenses and Other Current Assets    31,886
Total Current Assets $  459,566
Property and Equipment, at Cost-Net 48,980
Investment in and Advances to Affiliate 21,710
Other Assets    33,417
Total Assets $  563,673
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY
AND PARTNERS’ CAPITAL
Current Liabilities
Notes and Acceptances Payable – Banks $    73,731
Accounts Payable 74,244
Accrued Expenses and Other Liabilities 36,982
Current Portion of L ng-Term Debt      11,765
Total Current Liabilities $  196,722
Long-Term Debt 70,149
Other Non-Current Liabilities 15,149
Subordinated Notes       44,000
Total Liabilities $  326,020
Net Worth
Partners’ Capital 237,541
Cumulative Translation Adjustment            112
Total Partners’ Capital $   237,653
Total Liabilities and Partners’ Capital $   563,673
Exhibit 9
Jones Apparel Group, Inc.
Income Statement
(in thousands)
(for the years ended)
December 31, 1995December 31, 1994
Net Revenues $ 776,365 $  633,257
Cost of Sales    546,413    438,575
   Gross Profit $ 229,952 $  194,682
Selling, General and Administrative Expenses 139,135 115,307
Licensing Income       (10,314)    (8,487)
   Operating Income $  101,131 $  87,862
Other Income (expense)
   Investment Income $  445 $        695
   Interest Expense    (1,908)     (1,212)
   Income Before Income tax $     99,668 $   87,345
Provision for Income tax $    36,183     32,425
   Net Income $     63,485 $   54,920
Exhibit 10
Jones Apparel Group, Inc.
Balance Sheet
(in thousands)
ASSETS
December 31, 1995
Current Assets
Cash $ 16,864
Accounts Receivable, Net of Allowances       113,230
Inventories 176,626
Deferred Taxes 12,265
Prepaid Expenses and Other Current Assets  12,480
Total Current Assets $331,465
Property and Equipment, at Cost-Net   36,657
Intangibles  26,585
Deferred Taxes 120
Other Non Current Assets 6,132
Total Assets $400,959
LIABILITIES AND STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY
 AND PARTNERS' CAPITAL
Current Liabilities
Current Portion of Long-term Debt $          71
Current Portion of Capital Lease Obligations 2,256
Accounts Payable 59,077
Income Tax Payable 2,427
Accrued Expenses and Other Current Liabilities  6,781
Total Current Liabilities $   70,612
Long-term Debt $49
Obligations under Capital Leases  10,102
 Total Liabilities $   80,763
Excess of Net Assets Acquired Over Cost  $     5,221
Stockholders Equity
Common Stock  $        263
Paid-in-Capital in excess of Par  84,172
Retained Earnings  236,318
Cumulative Translation Adjustment  (1,140)
Treasury Stock  (4,638)
Total Stockholders Equity $ 314,975
 Total Liabilities and Stockholders Equity $400,959
Exhibit 11
Donna Karan International
Comparative Data on Peer Group Companies*
   Liz Claiborne Jones Apparel Group Donna Karan
1995        1994 1995 1994 1995**
Stock Price:  High $        30.00$       26.63 $         17.88 $      17.88 $          24.00
Stock Price:  Low $        14.38$       15.38 $         11.38 $      11.00 n/a
Earnings Per Share $          1.69$         1.06 $         $1.20 $        1.04 $            0.91
Weighted-Avg. Shares Outstanding75,003,00078,527,000 52,130,000 51,656,000 15,968,000
Book Value Per Share at Year-End $        13.41$       12.77 $          6.04 $        4.82 $           5.06
P/E Ratio High 18 25 17 17 26
P/E Ratio Low 9 15 9 11 n/a
Market Value (High)/ Book Value 2.24 2.08 3.29 3.71 4.74
Market Value(Low)/Book Value 1.07 1.20 1.88 2.28 n/a
Source:  Standard & Poors' Stock Reports, 1997, Donna Karan International Prospectus, June 27, 1996.
*   Polo Ralph Lauren data not available for 1994 and 1995.  The firm was a partnership.
** DKI information obtained from Predecessor Combined Statement of Income, on a pro-forma basis using the proposed IPO stock price.
Exhibit 12
Personal Consumption Expenditures
(in the United States)
Items           1996                   1995                 1994        
Food & Tobacco 806 15% 784 16% 762 16%
Clothing 336 6.5% 323 6.5% 313 6.6%
Personal Care 76 1.0% 72 1% 68 1.0%
Housing 1,379 26% 1313 26% 1,248 26%
Medical Care 913 18% 872 18% 826 18%
Personal Business 421 8% 389 8% 370 8%
Transportation 602 12% 572 12% 542 11%
Recreation 431 8% 403 8% 370 8%
Education 120 2% 112 2% 105 2%
Other 124 2% 118 2% 113 2%
Total 5,208 100% 4,958 100% 4,717 100%
Source:  Survey of Current Business, November 1997, page 29.
Exhibit 13
Donna Karan Product Lines and Major Competitors
DKI Line Competitors DKI Line Competitors DKI Line Competitors
The Designer Segment The Bridge Market Beauty Divison
CK by Calvin Klein
Donna Karan New Yorkâ Collection Armani Borgonuovo DKNYâ Womens Apparel Polo/Ralph Lauren Donna Karan New Yorkâ Chanel
for women Jil Sander Dana Buchman Fragrance for women Calvin Klein
Escada Ellen Tracy Giorgio Armani
Emmanuel DK Menä Fragrance and Boucheron
Donna Karan New Yorkâ Essentials Armani Le Collezion Anne Klein II Grooming Products for menIssey Miyake
for women Calvin Klein Tiffany
Michael Kors DKNYâ Mens Collection CK by Calvin Klein
Guess
Donna Karan New Yorkâ Black Label Giorgio Armani Mondo
for men Hugo Boss Nautica
Donna Karan New Yorkâ Signature Calvin Klein Polo/Ralph Lauren
for men Valantino Tommy Hilfiger
Vestimenta Versace Classic V2
Ermenegildo Zegna
DKNYâ Accessories By Paloma
Donna Karan New Yorkâ Accessories Prada for women Coach
for women Bottega Veneta Dooney & Bourke
Calvin Klein Ferragamo
Donna Karan New Yorkâ Shoes Giorgio Armani DKNYâ Shoes for women Anne Klein II
for women Gucci Bis (Charles Jourdan)
Prada Freelance
Calvin Klein Polo/Ralph Lauren
Robert Clergerie VS (Via Spiga)
Donna Karan New Yorkâ Shoes Dolce & Gabbana DKNYâ Shoes for men Cole Haan
for men Giorgio Armani Kenneth Cole
Gucci Paraboot
Fenestria Polo/Ralph Lauren
Ralph Lauren
Exhibit 13
Donna Karan Product Lines and Major Competitors, Continued
 Licensed Products
Licensed Marks Products Licensee
Donna Karan New Yorkä Women’s pantyhose, Hanes Hosiery, a division
DKNYâ knee high stockings, of Sara Lee Corp.
tights and socks
Donna Karan New Yorkä Women’s intimate apparel Wacoal America, Inc.
Donna Karan New Yorkä Sunglasses, optical frames, The Lantis Corporation
DKNYâ magnifiers, and eyewear
accessories
DKNYâ Children’s apparel Albert S.A.
DKNYâ KIDS
Donna Karan New Yorkä Paper patterns and Butterick Company, Inc.
DKNYâ knitting patterns (Vogue Patterns)
Source:  Donna Karan International Prospectus, June 27, 1996, pp. 44-51.
Exhibit 14
Selected Financial Markets Data
April-96 May-96 June-96
Treasury Rates:
Secondary Market for Bills:
    90 days 4.95 5.02 5.09
    6 Months 5.06 5.12 5.25
Notes and Bonds:
    1 Year 5.54 5.64 5.81
    5 Year 6.30 6.48 6.69
    10 Year 6.51 6.74 6.91
    30 Year 6.79 6.93 7.06
Bonds:
Corporate Bonds
    AA 7.68 7.77 7.87
    A 7.83 7.94 8.02
    BBB 7.95 8.08 8.21
    BB 8.47 8.62 8.77
Composite
    Long Term 6.94 7.08 7.20
    AA 7.48 7.61 7.76
    A 8.15 8.24 8.41
    BBB 8.63 8.77 8.98
Floating Rates:
    Prime Rate 8.25 8.25 8.25
    Commercial  Paper 5.38 5.42 5.57
Source:  Federal Reserve Bulletin
              Standard & Poors’ Bond Guide
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Exhibit 15 
Total Number of Initial Public Offerings (IPO's)
 in United States Markets
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Exhibit 16
Total Proceeds of Initial Public Offerings (IPO's)
in United States Markets (in billions)
